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This book is a considerably revised version of the author’s 2004 doctoral disser-
tation from the University of Nijmegen, entitled Transitivity: from semantics to 
structure. The book discusses what prototypical transitivity is, how it should be de-
fined, and how a prototype analysis relates to other approaches to transitivity, such 
as that based on markedness. It also discusses how the definition of prototypical 
transitivity can be employed in the analysis of a number of phenomena, such as 
case-marking, experiencer constructions, and so-called ambitransitives. The basic 
claim is that transitivity is iconic: a construction with two distinct, independent 
arguments is prototypically used to refer to an event with two distinct, indepen-
dent participants.
The book consists of an introduction, eight chapters and an appendix. The 
references are followed by author, language, and subject indices.
Chapter One is an introductory chapter, in which the author explains theo-
retical preliminaries such as functional typology and prototype theory. She also 
provides a definition of a transitive clause and introduces some terminologies used 
in the book. In this book, a transitive clause means a construction with two syntac-
tically privileged arguments although exactly what characterizes a transitive clause 
varies from language to language. To refer to the participants encoded in one- and 
two-participant clauses, the author uses the well-established terms S, A, and O: S 
referring to the single participant of an intransitive clause, A referring to the most 
“agent-like” participant of a two-participant clause, and O referring to the second, 
non-agentive participant of a two-participant clause. This use of the terms differs 
slightly from that of Dixon (1979, 1994), where A and O are specifically defined 
as the roles found in formally transitive constructions. It is more similar to that of 
Hopper and Thompson (1980), where A and O are used to refer to the participants 
in a two-participant clause. This book makes no claims about the grammatical re-
lations or roles that the NP arguments referring to these participants might bear to 
the verb. Thus S, A and O refer to participants of one- and two-participant events, 
regardless of their structural encoding; the second participant of a two-participant 
clause is referred to as an O whether it is encoded as a syntactic direct object or as 
an oblique argument of an extended intransitive construction.
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Chapter Two asks the question of why a prototype definition is a good way of 
approaching the phenomenon of transitivity. Another influential approach, based 
on the notion of naturalness or markedness, is contrasted with the prototype anal-
ysis of transitivity. A wide range of data suggests that transitivity may be a matter 
of degree. In other words, the membership of the category ‘transitive verb’ or ‘tran-
sitive clause’ is gradable, depending on an item’s degree of similarity to a central 
exemplar — a prototype structure. Jacobsen (1992), among others, has taken a 
similar view on transitivity as far as I know. Næss states that a prototypical transi-
tive clause is taken to describe an event involving a volitionally acting ‘agent’ par-
ticipant, performing a concrete, dynamic action, which has a perceptible and last-
ing effect on a specific ‘patient’. In addition, the event should be presented as real 
and concluded; that is, the clause should show perfective rather than imperfective 
aspect, realis rather than irrealis mood, be positive rather than negated, etc.
Chapter Three proposes that the notion of distinctness of participants is the 
most important factor in the transitive-intransitive continuum, and that the tran-
sitive prototype must be defined in terms of the presence of two participants which 
are clearly distinct not just physically, but in the sense that they play maximally 
distinct roles in the event in question. The following hypothesis is formulated as a 
basic criterion of transitivity (p30).
The Maximally Distinct Arguments Hypothesis: A prototypical transitive clause 
is one where the two participants are maximally semantically distinct in terms of 
their roles in the event described by the clause.
The author argues that a prototypical transitive event involves a prototypical agent 
and a prototypical patient, neither of which shares any of the defining properties of 
the other. However, it remains to be defined what the relevant defining properties 
of agents and patients are. This is a controversial question, and the remainder of 
this chapter discusses the difficulty of defining the agent and the patient. Neverthe-
less it turns out that there is no “correct” definition of the category “agent”. Næss 
neither claims her definition to be the only correct definition of the term “agent”, 
nor chooses another label although perhaps it would have been sensible to do so 
given the amount of debate over the term. What the author has proposed, quite 
independently from the debate over the precise properties of the “agent” category, 
are participant roles, or roles that participants play in states of affairs, that is, they 
are extralinguistic entities. In this book, therefore, no assumption has been made 
that verbs subcategorize for specific “thematic roles”. The terms ‘Agent’ and ‘Patient’ 
in this book have been employed strictly as labels for clusters of properties exhib-
ited by noun phrases when these function as core arguments of specific clauses. In 
other words, these terms should be taken to refer to participant roles rather than 
to thematic roles. Thus, the author defines “agents” as volitional instigators and 
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“patient” as affected participants. This definition is far from new, but according to 
the Maximally Distinguished Arguments Hypothesis, these categories are defined 
by the properties/features — volitionality, instigation, and affectedness — assigned 
the values ‘+’ or ‘−’. An Agent participant is thus defined as being + Volitional 
or [+VOL], and +Instigating or [+INST], while a Patient is defined as +Affected 
or [+AFF]. In addition, by the Maximally Distinguished Arguments Hypothesis, 
each of the categories receives the value ‘−’ for the defining property/properties 
of the opposing category, so that a complete definition of the category Agent is 
[+VOL, +INST, −AFF], and of Patient [−VOL, −INST, +AFF]. This definition is a 
feature-based definition of the Agent and Patient categories. Semantic specifica-
tions of other participant types are also discussed in Chapter Five.
Based on the proposed definition of the transitive prototype, the author begins 
to examine particular non-canonical transitive construction types from Chapter 
Four. First of all, she discusses in some detail constructions where the agentive par-
ticipant is itself affected by the event. The affected agentive participant is called an 
Affected Agent. Affected Agent can be characterized as [+VOL, +INST, +AFF]. Ac-
cording to the definition of prototypical Agent and Patient in Chapter Three, clauses 
with Affected Agents deviate from the semantic transitive prototype. Næss argues 
that verbs with an affected agent argument should tend to occur in constructions 
other than a canonical transitive clause. It is quite convincingly illustrated that this 
is the case in a wide range of languages. There is in fact a class of verbs crossling-
uistically characterized by having an Affected Agent argument, namely so-called 
ingestive verbs, the most prototypical of which are ‘eat’ and ‘drink’. Such verbs show 
a strong crosslinguistic tendency towards being expressed in formally intransitive 
clauses. The best-known and most frequently-discussed case of the “intransitive 
behavior” of ‘eat’ verbs is so-called indefinite object deletion (IOD), found in Eng-
lish and other languages: He is eating the apple/an apple/apples vs. He is eating. The 
“missing object” here is necessarily interpreted as indefinite. The phenomenon of 
IOD is examined in more detail in Chapter Six. The ways in which clauses with 
verbs meaning ‘eat’ deviate from the prototypical transitive construction were ex-
amined across languages in this chapter. In a number of languages, there is a formal 
link between the verb ‘eat’ and various markers of agent affectedness. The link may 
be of two types: either the verb ‘eat’ appears with a marker of agent affectedness, 
such as a reflexive. Alternatively, the verb ‘eat’ may itself be grammaticalised into a 
marker of agent affectedness. In most cases, such uses of ‘eat’ express a sense of un-
dergoing, affectedness or adversativity. Although the author’s examples are mostly 
illuminating, her claim with regard to one Korean example is not necessarily true. 
Næss claims that ‘eat’ is used in cases where the subject is seen as agentive and af-
fected. It also occurs in a number of cases where no control is implies, and that in 
Korean, lack of control is specifically implied by the ‘eat’ construction (p75–6).
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 (1) ku-ka sonkkarak-ul callu-a mok-ot-ta
  he-nom finger-acc cut-conn eat-past-dec
  ‘He accidentally cut (one of) his fingers.’
It seems to me, however, that the lack of control is not implied by the ‘eat’ auxiliary 
verb, but by the main verb itself or the event itself, i.e. ‘cutting one’s own fingers’. 
If we replace the main verb with other transitive verbs, the lack of control is not 
implied, as in example 2.
 (2) ku-ka chinku-lul nolly-e mok-ot-ta.
  he-nom friend-acc tease-conn eat-past-dec
  ‘He made fun of his friend.’
Therefore we cannot generalize that lack of control is implied by the ‘eat’ construc-
tion in Korean. Given the wide range of crosslinguistic data the author has incor-
porated in the book, however, this sort of minor misinterpretation may perhaps 
be inevitable.
There are other constructions in which the affectedness of the agent may be re-
flected in language structure. Among others, the difference between the two caus-
atives in Hindi in terms of the notion of affected agent on the one hand and the af-
fectedness of the causee agent on the other, is also discussed in this chapter (p63f). 
The semantic difference between different causatives in terms of the affectedness of 
the causee argument has been discussed in many languages including Korean (see 
Yeon 2003). Another obvious example is middle constructions, the main function 
of which is to indicate the affectedness of an initiating entity. The author concludes 
this chapter with remarks that she hopes to have shown that ‘eat’ is not an example 
of a prototypical transitive verb although in some literature it is cited as such.
Chapter Five discusses all other deviant constructions than the canonical tran-
sitive construction. Having defined the Agent ([+VOL, +INST, −AFF]), Patient 
([−VOL, −INST, +AFF]) and Affected Agent [+VOL, +INST, +AFF], based on fea-
tures in Chapters Three and Four, the author illustrates that all other distributions 
of the semantic features [+/- VOL], [+/- INST], [+/- AFF] across the participants 
of a two participant clause should lead to the use of a construction other than a 
fully transitive clause in at least some languages. The deviant participant types dis-
cussed in Chapter Five, which should also be understood in terms of participant 
roles rather than thematic roles, are as follows:
 [+VOL, −INST, +AFF]: Volitional Undergoer
 [−VOL, +INST, −AFF]: Force
 [−VOL, +INST, +AFF]: Instrument
 [+VOL, −INST, −AFF]: Frustrative
 [−VOL, −INST, −AFF]: Neutral
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Just a few notes are needed here to clarify what these participant types are. Voli-
tional undergoers have the same semantic feature specification as experiencers 
and beneficiaries, and would be expected to receive similar formal encoding. Voli-
tional Undergoer is used as a cover term for all participant types characterizable as 
above. In this book, the term Force is used to refer to any participant characteriz-
able as above, regardless of whether the participant is an inanimate “force” or an 
animate “involuntary agent”. Many languages distinguish formally between Forces 
and Instruments — that is between entities which bring about events by virtue of 
their own inherent power and entities which do so only through being manipulat-
ed by an agent participant. By assuming instruments to be [+Affected], this feature 
specification can not only define instruments as opposed to Agents and Forces, but 
also capture the similarity between Instruments and Patients which is reflected 
formally in certain languages: these two argument types are both manipulated 
by another entity, and so they are both affected. Frustrative does not appear to 
correspond to any of the traditionally recognized “thematic roles”, and may seem 
like an unlikely candidate for a linguistically relevant category — a specifically 
“non-doing” participant. However, there are some languages which recognize a 
category of participants which are volitionally involved in that they want or at-
tempt to instigate an act, but are unable to or prevented from carrying out the act, 
so that no actual instigation takes place. Some interesting examples are cited in the 
book (p100ff). Neutral, the category defined by the value ‘-’ for all the three fea-
tures, represents a participant which is not directly involved with the event either 
in terms of participating in its instigation or in registering its effect. The stimulus 
argument of experience clauses is one type of argument which is not normally 
conceived of as affected by the event in question. Many languages mark at least 
some stimulus arguments differently from Patients. For example, in Japanese and 
Korean, the object of ‘like’ takes the nominative case, rather than the accusative 
case used for affected objects. Having discussed how various types of core argu-
ments are to be described in terms of feature combinations, the author assumes 
that verbs do not subcategorize for roles or argument types, but rather for feature 
values. A verb such as English break, for example, may take a volitionally instigat-
ing subject argument, an agent (John broke the window (on purpose)), or a nonvo-
litional subject argument (John accidentally broke the window), or an inanimate 
force (The bolt of lightning broke the window) or even an instrument (The hammer 
broke the window). The best way to solve the problem of verbs being compatible 
with several different types of participants (in the case of break, Agents, Forces, or 
Instruments), is to assume the verb break in English only requires of its subject 
being [+INST]; it is compatible with any values for the remaining features. The 
remainder of the chapter discusses properties of argument NPs that are relevant 
for transitivity such as animacy and definiteness/specificity/referentiality. Also 
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discussed here are clause-level properties relevant to transitivity such as negation, 
mood, and aspect.
Chapter Six deals with so-called ambitransitives, arguing that the phenom-
enon known as indefinite object deletion (IOD) is most felicitously analyzed not 
as a lexical property of certain specific verbs, but as a syntactic detransitivisation 
mechanism, typically employed when an object has a low degree of distinctness. 
The author has shown that the semantic classes of verbs which typically undergo 
IOD share the property of reduced transitivity vis-à-vis the prototype, by virtue 
of a low degree of distinctness. Iterative and generic contexts, for instance, can 
be analyzed as instances of low transitivity. Iterative or generic statements do not 
describe a single instance of an action affecting a single patient, but rather a set 
of similar actions affecting different patients. The object of such clauses is less in-
dividuated, clearly representing reduced semantic transitivity. The author argues 
that they would be, therefore, eligible for being encoded in formally intransitive 
clauses, i.e. without an overt object. To support this, she provides evidence from 
many languages that suggests a link between IOD and a certain degree of reduced 
semantic transitivity (p136f).
Chapter Seven argues that certain case-marking data can be better explained 
with reference to transitivity as defined through the maximal semantic distinction 
of arguments. First the author outlines both the discriminatory analysis and the 
indexing analysis to show that some languages have case-markers which cannot 
easily be explained under either of the two analyses. Rather, they appear to relate 
to semantic properties of the clause as a whole: whether the event is construed 
as involving both a controlling Agent and an affected Patient. In other words, in 
a number of languages object marking may depend on certain properties of the 
subject/agent; specifically, whether or not the agent is acting intentionally. The op-
posite phenomenon also occurs, i.e. subject case-marking depending on proper-
ties of the object. To put it differently, case-marking does not apply when the par-
ticipants are not in maximal semantic distinction. The analyses of case-marking 
behavior and data from many languages in this chapter were presently nicely and 
it shows the author’s original interpretation. The author’s claim is that the canoni-
cal function of core case-marking is to discriminate between the participants in a 
fully transitive clause, that is, between Agents and Patients in maximal semantic 
distinction.
Chapter Eight examines clauses of experience and shows a wide range of varia-
tion in the encoding of such clauses. Clauses of experience obviously do not exhib-
it a maximal semantic distinction and the traditional label “experiencer” is a fairly 
heterogeneous category. It corresponds to at least two distinct participant types — 
Volitional Undergoer and Affected Agents. As a consequence, we would expect the 
encoding of experiencer participants to be variable. Therefore the author admits 
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that experience events are difficult to classify in terms of the properties which 
define the transitive prototype. On the other hand, a common strategy for the 
encoding of experiencer arguments is the use of a case-marker commonly labeled 
the dative. The dative case shows a diverse range of functions across languages, 
and therefore providing a crosslinguistically adequate definition of the category 
‘dative’ is far from straightforward. The problematic nature notwithstanding, Næss 
argues that the dative, whose most typical use is to mark recipients, benefactives, 
and experiencers, can be explained by the fact that these participants all share 
the same feature specifications: [+VOL, −INST, +AFF]. Lastly, in Chapter Nine, 
the author touches upon some issues that go beyond prototypical transitivity such 
as the traditional grammatical relations ‘subject’ and ‘object’, and the question of 
structural vs. semantic case in a brief manner.
The book contains a large amount of illuminating data with arguments con-
vincing enough to persuade its readers to take an interest in the question as the 
author originally hoped. It also successfully demonstrates that how linguistic 
structure is motivated by aspects of human cognition. It is a welcome and worthy 
addition to the literature on transitivity, one of the most fundamental aspects of 
linguistic structure.
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